Islamic State Plots Against Israel Surpass Pre-War Total in Three Years
New data reveals 46 attempted attacks since October 2023, exceeding the 50 recorded in the prior nine and a half years.
By Noor Phillips ·
Israeli security forces have disrupted 46 Islamic State-linked plots since the Hamas invasion of October 2023, a rate that exceeds the total number of arrests made in the preceding nine and a half years.
Aaron Zelin, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, released a publication on Thursday detailing the surge in jihadist activity. His analysis compiles a database of publicly reported arrests by the Israel Defense Forces, Shin Bet, and other agencies dating back to 2014.
The data shows a sharp acceleration in operational tempo. In the nearly decade before the war, Israeli forces conducted 50 arrest operations related to the group. Since the October 7 massacre, that number has reached 46, indicating that the group has attempted more attacks in the last three years than in the previous 9.5 years combined.
Zelin notes that the nature of these threats has become more complex. Prior to the conflict, foreign fighters primarily operated in Syria or spread propaganda online, with only 18 actual or attempted attacks on foreign soil. Since October 2023, the group has attempted 28 attacks, though almost none have succeeded. The plots increasingly involve direct connections to Islamic State leadership rather than lone-wolf supporters.
Specific cases illustrate this evolution. In late December 2023, investigators arrested two men in the Ras al-Amud neighborhood of east Jerusalem. The 19- and 20-year-old suspects allegedly planned to load a truck with gas canisters and detonate it near the Knesset. They possessed chemicals for explosives, a notebook with bomb-making instructions, and an Islamic State flag.
Other cells have targeted military and civilian infrastructure. Near Hebron, a four-man cell whose leader maintained contact with operatives abroad manufactured approximately 100 explosive devices for use against Israeli soldiers. In the Arab town of Tayibe, near Kfar Saba, five men calculated the explosive material needed to collapse the Azrieli Towers in Tel Aviv and planned a car bombing at the adjacent mall.
The group’s strategy appears designed to encourage Palestinians to shift allegiance from Hamas. In January 2024, Islamic State spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari urged Palestinians to view Hamas as apostate and an Iranian proxy. He called for supporters to kill Jews and Christians in the streets and alleyways of the West.
Zelin observes that while the group targets Israel’s regional protectors, it has inspired deadly violence domestically. In 2022, two Arab Israeli terrorists who swore allegiance to the group killed two Border Police officers, Yazan Fallah and Shirel Aboukaret, and wounded 12 others. In April 2024, an inspired terrorist, Ahmed Dawabsha, murdered 14-year-old Benjamin Achimeir in the West Bank.
Many recent suspects are teenagers radicalized online, but more than a third were in direct contact with members abroad. In 2025, three residents of Arara contacted a Syrian operative via TikTok, who sent manuals for building bombs. Another cell in Sur Baher planned to travel to Syria for bomb-making training.
Israel has responded by expanding its pursuit of these networks beyond its borders, conducting nighttime raids to arrest suspects and carrying out strikes in Syria.
